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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
TRENT PARSONS, #93-A-5945,
Petitioner,
       
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #16-1-2011-0187.38
INDEX # 2011-428
-against- ORI #NY016015J
ANDREA W. EVANS, Chief Executive Officer,




This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Trent Parsons, verified on April 26, 2011 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on April 29, 2011.  Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the May 2010 determination denying him
parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The Court issued an
Order to Show Cause on May 6, 2011 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer,
including Confidential Exhibits B and D, supported by the Affirmation of Brian J.
O’Donnell, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated June 29, 2011.  The Court has received
no Reply thereto from petitioner.
On July 9, 1993 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County, to
concurrent indeterminate sentences of 4 years to life and 3 to 6 years upon his convictions
of the crimes of Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon 3° and Attempted Criminal
Sale of a Controlled Substance 3°.  The offense underlying petitioner’s attempted weapon
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possession conviction/sentence was committed on December 1, 1992, while petitioner was
at liberty under parole supervision from a previously-imposed sentence.  The offense
underlying petitioner’s attempted sale of a controlled substance conviction/sentence was
committed less than two and one-half months later, on February 11, 1993, while petitioner
was out on bail from the attempted weapon possession charge.  
After having been denied discretionary parole release on seven previous occasions
petitioner made his eighth appearance before a Parole Board on May 25, 2010.  Following
that appearance a decision was rendered again denying petitioner parole and directing
that he be held for an additional 24 months.  All three parole commissioners concurred
in the denial determination which reads as follows:
“PAROLE DENIED.  AFTER A PERSONAL INTERVIEW, RECORD
REVIEW, AND DELIBERATION, THIS PANEL FINDS YOUR RELEASE
IS  INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.  YOUR
INSTANT OFFENSES OF ATT. CPW 3RD AND ATT. CSCS 3RD
OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE ON PAROLE.  PAST PROBATION,
LOCAL JAIL TIME AND A PRIOR PRISON TERM ALL FAILED TO
DETER YOU FROM COMMITTING THE INSTANT OFFENSES. 
CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO YOUR DENIAL OF AN EARNED
ELIGIBILITY CERTIFICATE AND RECEIPT OF TWO DISCIPLINARY
VIOLATIONS SINCE YOUR LAST PAROLE HEARING.  DUE TO THIS
POOR COMPLIANCE WITH DOCS RULES, YOUR RELEASE AT THIS
TIME IS DENIED.  THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY YOU
WOULD NOT LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING
THE LAW.”
The parole denial determination was affirmed on administrative appeal.  This proceeding
ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary
release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
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probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.  In
making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered:  (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . . [and] (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
to the inmate . . .” In addition to the above, where, as here, the minimum period of
imprisonment was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the
seriousness of the underlying offense (with “due consideration” to, among other things, 
the “recommendations of the sentencing court . . .” ) as well as  the inmate’s prior criminal
record. See Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a).
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be
judicial functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law
§259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26
AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051.  Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
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It is petitioner’s contention that the Parole Board failed to adequately address and
consider all relevant statutory factors, focusing instead on his prison disciplinary record,
the nature of the offenses underlying his current incarceration and his prior criminal
history.  Although petitioner acknowledges that the severity of the offense(s) underlying
an inmate’s incarceration is a relevant factor that may be considered by a Parole Board,
he asserts that “ . . . it is not to be the determining factor . . .”  Petitioner further asserts
as follows:
“ . . . [T]he law is even clearer that at a second or subsequent parole board
interview, they [presumably the Parole Board] may only focus on the
inmate’s prison records such as: temporary release participation, release
plans; or potential employment offers.  The focus is not to be centered on
the seriousness of the offense or the inmate’s prior criminal record.
This was petitioner’s [eighth] parole board appearance, yet the board only
focused on two minor misbehavior reports; as well as the nature of the
crime (again); the petitioner’s criminal history (again).  This was their
reasoning (again) to deny petitioner release and hold again for 24 months.”
A parole board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision.  See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713.  As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
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it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.”  Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).  
A  review of the Inmate Status Report and the transcript of the parole hearing
reveals that the Board had before it, and considered, the appropriate statutory factors
including petitioner’s programming/ vocational record (including the fact that he was
denied an Earned Eligibility Certificate), disciplinary record, release plans, as well as the
circumstances of the crimes underlying his incarceration (including the fact that such
crimes were committed while on parole) and prior criminal record.  See Zhang v. Travis,
10 AD3d 828.  During the course of the May 25, 2010 parole interview, moreover,
petitioner was afforded an opportunity to discuss matters he considered relevant to the
discretionary parole release determination.  In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no
basis to conclude that the Parole Board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. 
See Pearl v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058  and  Zhang v. Travis, 10 
AD3d  828. 
Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the denial
of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, the circumstances of the crime underlying petitioner’s
incarceration, his prior criminal record and his prison disciplinary record.  See Perez v.
Evans, 76 AD3d 1130, Hall v. New York State Division of Parole, 66 AD3d 1322 and
Pearl v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058.
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Finally, the Court finds no statutory, regulatory or judicial authority barring a
Parole Board from considering the nature of the offense underlying an inmate’s
incarceration or his/her prior criminal record at such inmate’s second and subsequent
Board appearances.  
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed. 
Dated: August 25, 2011 at 
Indian Lake, New York.        __________________________
                                                                                        S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice
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